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Prominent law firms' recent adoption of artificial intelligence
technology has scholars and practitioners engaged in wide-ranging
speculation about a new era of automated lawyering. The latest
technological innovations hold the promise of streamlining legal research,
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contractual provisions, and analyzing inconceivably large quantities of data.
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But along with the excitement over the nearly limitless potential of rapidly
advancing legal technology comes uncertainty about the future role of the
human lawyer and a bevy of concerns for the profession. In artificial
intelligence, attorneys see both a welcome liberation from picayune tasks
and frightening implications for their work stream and the relevance of their
existing skill set.
But technology-assisted lawyering is by no means a new phenomenon.
While recent attention has been focused on new research and litigation
capabilities, transactional and estate planning lawyers have utilized
document automation and assembly software for decades. These programs
can perform an array of functions, from populating repetitive fields in a
simple purchase agreement to producing an entire portfolio of documents for
a client's estate plan. More elaborate programs use an attorney's responses
to a series of prompts to generate complex and professional-looking work
product like trust agreements.
Like artificial intelligence programs, the proliferation of automation and
assembly software presents both opportunities to improve the quality and
efficiency of legal services and also difficult questions regarding the
appropriate role of an attorney providing technology-assisted counsel. And
despite decades of widespread use, scant attention has been paid to the
ethical implications that reliance on technology may have on transactional
practice. In particular, although automation can reduce technical errors and
rapidly incorporate evolving laws and techniques, reliance on software
creates risks of undue deference to computer-generated outputs and of
temptation to undertake representations that strain an attorney's sphere of
proficiency.
This Article addresses the expectations for effective transactional
representation by highlighting several common missteps in typical
transactional engagements. It then describes the increasingly sophisticated
tools attorneys have used to more efficiently and effectively draft legal
documents. The Article then turns to the potential of automation and
artificial intelligence programs to eliminate drafting mistakes and to raise the
standard of transactional practice. It implores caution, however, as attorneys
rely more heavily on computer assistance in delivering legal services and
products. As it becomes easier to generate a professional-looking work
product in a wide range of complex areas of law, the risks of professional
misadventure multiply. In this sense, technology amplifies some perils as it
resolves others.
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DUTIES AND EXPOSURE IN TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE

Attorneys face countless risks when drafting transactional documents. In
the course of preparing a series of complex agreements, it is not uncommon
for an attorney to employ legally insufficient or outdated language, to
neglect to remove terms from a prior negotiation, or more generally, to fail
to effectuate the client's intent or to incorporate the client's unique
circumstances.' On the more benign end of the spectrum, inconsistent
provisions can create ambiguities that only potentially imperil a client's
objectives. More malignant errors can trigger unanticipated tax liability or
exposure for securities law violations or may place the client in an entirely
inappropriate transactional structure.
Very generally, transactional representation errors fall into two broad
categories: flawed planning and flawed execution. Flawed planning revolves
around the soundness of the substantive legal advice memorialized in the
documents, and it describes circumstances where, even though the
documents are prepared accurately, the transaction or structure itself was
inadvisable under the circumstances. For example, flawed planning might
occur in the estate context if the attorney employs a less advantageous
structure or fails to anticipate common contingencies that jeopardize the
client's desired tax treatment or plan of distribution.2 Flawed execution, on
the other hand, involves circumstances where the legal requirements of the
transaction are not met, or where drafting mistakes or omissions undermine
the intended effect of the transaction. For example, flawed execution might
occur when a party to a transaction intended to qualify as a like-kind
(Section 1031) exchange receives a prohibited cash payment.3

1. See, e.g., Martin D. Begleiter, The Gambler Breaks Even: Legal Malpractice in
ComplicatedEstate Planning, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 277, 287 (2003).
2.
See, for example, Sims v. Hall, 592 S.E.2d 315 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003), where the
attorney failed to inform his client that she could avoid paying significant estate taxes by
disclaiming property she inherited from her daughter. The appellate court upheld judgment
against the attorney in the amount of $191,543. Id. at 320. "[The attorney's] duty to inform
[the client] of the right to disclaimer compelled him to ascertain if executing a disclaimer was
in his client's interest or, at a minimum, advise her of the existence or significance of a
disclaimer." Id.; see also Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173-74 (Alaska 1983)
(finding that clients stated a claim for professional negligence when attorneys did not advise
them of right to disclaim interest in estate, causing increased estate tax liability).
3.
See, for example, Wo Yee Hing Realty, Corp. v. Stern, 949 N.Y.S.2d 50, 63 (App.
Div. 2012), where the transaction ran afoul of the requirements for non-recognition as a
Section 1031 "like-kind" exchange when the attorney failed to ensure that the purchaser made
the checks payable to a "qualified intermediary," and the purchaser instead paid his seller
clients directly.
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This Part details the essential ethical duties of attorneys engaged in
typical transactional undertakings and provides an account of the ways in
which lawyers can fall short of their obligations in planning and execution.
In so doing, it provides context for understanding the utility of the resources
transactional lawyers rely upon to deliver consistent and effective
documents.
A.

Requisite Knowledge and Skill

The basic ethical obligations of an attorney in any matter are to provide
the client with "competent representation" 4 and to consult with and explain
the matter to the client.5 Fundamental to competent representation is the
expectation that the attorney possess or obtain the requisite substantive
knowledge and skill. 6 Requisite knowledge and skill, in tum, hinges on the
difficulty of the matter, 7 the attorney's experience (both general and specific
to the field in question), "the preparation and study" the lawyer can devote
to the issue, "and whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or
consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in question."

4.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
5.
Id. r. 1.4(a)(2), (b). The New Jersey Superior Court has even set forth an extensive
framework for analyzing whether transactional attorneys have met their standard of care. See
Cottone v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, No. L-4966-0, 2014 WL 4287002, at *11-12 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Sept. 2, 2014). If included in the scope of representation, "failure to perform" one of
the following "in a reasonably competent manner may indicate a breach of the standard of
care." Id. at *12. Lawyers should "ascertain[] the client's business objectives through
appropriate consultation" and provide the client with "reasonable advice" on "legal and
strategic issues bearing on those . . .objectives." Id. at *11. They should "scrutinize the
proposed agreement to ensure that the writing effectuates" those goals. Id. at *12. They should
"review the written agreement with the client, to determine that the client understood the
material terms that might reasonably affect the client's decision to execute it." Id. And they
should tell the client about the "various provisions to accomplish each of the client's stated
objectives." Id. If not, they should "ensure that the client assents to the omission of any such
objective." Id.; see also Lisa L. Dahm, Practical Tips for Drafting Contracts and Avoiding
EthicalIssues, 46 TEx. J. BUS. L. 89, 100 (2014) ("[T]he successful transactional attorney will
draft language that is clear, precise, and tailored to meet the client's expressed objectives.");

David Hricik, Infinite Combinations: Whether the Duty of Competency Requires Lawyers to
Include Choice of Law Clauses in Contracts They Draftfor Their Clients, 12 WILLIAMETTE J.
INT'L L. & DISP. RESOL. 241, 246-47 (2004) ("A competently drafted contract clearly sets
forth the obligations of the parties and avoids foreseeable litigation about its meaning.").
6.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
7.
In most circumstances, the attorney must only be as competent as a general
practitioner, but some cases may require specialized knowledge. Id.
8.
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt.
B (AM. LAW INST. 2000) ("The duty is one of reasonableness in the circumstances."). The duty

of sufficient legal knowledge is the pillar of legal representation-a client "[h]ires the lawyer
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In essence, attorneys must know the basics and be able to thoroughly address
the unknowns through research or association of other counsel. 9

because the lawyer knows the law." Barnes v. Turner, 606 S.E.2d 849, 851 (Ga. 2004); see
also Roy M. Adams & Thomas W. Abendroth, Malpractice Climate Heats Up for Estate
Planners, 126 TR. & EST. 41, 42, 49 (1987) ("[T]he practitioner who undertakes to
prepare . . estate planning documents . . may be responsible for knowing or learning many
of the finer points of estate and trust law, or tax law, regardless of his own degree of
expertise.... Certainly the attorney should attempt to educate himself with regard to relevant
statutory and case law and to keep abreast of current developments by attending seminars and
lectures on the field."). Attorneys may still be liable even when they consult specialists:
The attorney who consults a specialist without advising his client will be held liable
for any negligence on the part of the specialist. . . . When an attorney associates with
a specialist with consent of his client, the question may turn on the care with which
the attorney selected the specialist and how reasonable was his reliance. While it
may be possible to shift liability to a specialist, a lawyer who relies on a specialist to
carry out a duty that is within the skill and knowledge of the ordinary attorney will
not be relieved of responsibility for the results of the specialist's act or
omission.... Generally, if the general practitioner and the specialist are splitting
fees, both will be liable.
24 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Legal Malpractice Estate, Will, and Succession Matters § 7

Westlaw (2017) (emphasis added). The attorney's liability, of course, depends on whether the
actions were taken within the scope of representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.2(c) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) (providing for limited representation).
9.
The attorney must know basic legal principles "which are commonly known by well
informed attorneys," and uncover those more obscure legal rules which "may readily be found
by standard research techniques." Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975). If the law on
a subject is unclear, attorneys do not breach their duty of care if they simply "fail to anticipate
the manner in which the uncertainty will be resolved." Id. Yet, even in those cases the attorney
must still "undertake reasonable research in an effort to ascertain relevant legal principles and
to make an informed decision . .. ." Id.; see Reibman v. Senie, 756 N.Y.S.2d 164 (App. Div.
2003); Gimbel v. Waldman, 84 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (citing Goodman and
Mitchell v. Walker, 30 Ala. 482, 496 (Ala. 1857)) (If the law is clear, "has existed and been
published long enough to justify the belief that it was known to the profession, then a disregard
of such rule by an attorney at law renders him accountable for the losses caused by such
negligence or want of skill; negligence, if knowing the rule, he disregarded it; want of skill if
he was ignorant of the rule"); see also Goebel v. Lauderdale, 263 Cal. Rptr. 275, 276, 278 (Ct.
App. 1989) (attorney breached duty of care when he advised client general contractor to take
payment and stop work without ascertaining the existence of a relevant criminal statute,
resulting in criminal charges against the client); Degen v. Steinbrink, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814
(App. Div. 1922) ("[A]n attorney is obligated to know the law relating to the matter for which
he/she is representing a client and it is the attorney's duty, if he has not knowledge of the
statutes, to inform himself, for, like any artisan, by undertaking the work, he represents that he
is capable of performing it in a skillful manner.")
No liability attaches for an error of judgment on a point of doubtful construction or
a point of law not settled by a court of last resort and on which a reasonable doubt
may be entertained by informed lawyers. Nevertheless, the rule of reasonable
research requires that an opinion given on a doubtful point of law be based on
sufficient research to enable the attorney to give an informed and intelligent
determination.
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In the constant struggle to attract and retain clients, lawyers frequently
are forced to grapple with the limits of their expertise and their capacity to
provide high-quality work at an acceptable cost and on a feasible timeline.
The temptation to commit to delivering complex work product on
unreasonable deadlines is ever present.
Occasionally, attorneys are candid about their inexperience with a
proposed transaction. Those frank lawyers are particularly vulnerable to
negligence claims when they nonetheless undertake unfamiliar
representations and then fail to satisfy basic legal requirements. One court
admonished a lawyer for telling the clients "that he was not qualified to
handle a 1031 exchange" and still undertaking "the preparation of the
contract of sale."'0 Likewise, in Home v. Peckham," a general practitioner
disclosed to his clients that he "had no knowledge of tax matters," but
2
nevertheless agreed to draft documents to establish a "Clifford" trust' if

another professional provided tax advice.13
Even absent such outright acknowledgements, in relatively
straightforward commercial transactions, patently defective documents
themselves can illustrate the attorney's lack of competence in the matter. In
one notable case, an attorney drafted a promissory note that failed to include
"a due date, a default or acceleration clause, or . .. an address for the

AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, supra note 8,

§ 2.

10. See Wo Yee Hing Realty, Corp. v. Stern, 949 N.Y.S.2d 50, 61-63 (App. Div. 2012).
In that case, the attorney failed to ensure that a transaction met the requirements for nonrecognition in a Section 1031 "like-kind" exchange because, rather than making the check
payable to a "qualified intermediary," the purchaser paid the attorney's seller clients directly.
Id. at 63. Because the clients could not show that they were capable of acquiring a replacement
property but-for the lawyer's negligence, the lawyer escaped malpractice liability. Id. at 65;
see also Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, Mo. v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank of Belleville, 633 N.E.2d
1267, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding issue of material fact as to whether attorney was
negligent in giving tax advice and drafting document that did not qualify for tax exclusions).
11. Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1979).
12. The clients, who had formed a corporation to manufacture wood products using a
patented process, proposed to execute a non-exclusive license allowing the corporation to
manufacture the products and then transfer to the trust the rights to the royalties from the nonexclusive license. Id. at 716.
13. Id. Although the expert was a CPA and had worked as a tax accountant for two or
three years, he "had been licensed to practice law less than a year ..... Id. After the CPA
approved of the plan, the attorney drafted the documents. Id. When the IRS later assessed the
clients with a tax deficiency, the clients sued the attorney for negligent draftsmanship. Id. at
717. The court found for the clients, reasoning that the issue was not so unclear as to shield the
attorney from liability, and that the attorney should have referred his clients to a specialist. Id.
at 720-21. The court evidently did not view the attorney's consultation with the expert as a
sufficient referral, possibly because there were issues of fact about the extent of disclosure to
the expert and the expert's limited involvement. See id. at 716.
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"

borrower,"1 4 and in another, an attorney filed defective chattel mortgages in
two states without ascertaining the requirements of the respective
jurisdictions.
These cases highlight problems that can result when attorneys accept
representations without possessing (or obtaining) a command of the most
essential legal issues involved. Although it seems obvious that an attorney
must have a fundamental understanding of the legal principles underlying
any transactional representation, the case reporters are littered with examples
of lawyers who failed to demonstrate this too often assumed competence.
But effective transactional representation extends beyond a grasp of the
relevant legal doctrines.
Merely knowing the law is insufficient; attorneys must actually apply
that knowledge to accomplish their clients' goals. To do so, the attorney
must probe and analyze "the factual and legal elements" of the client's issue
and employ "methods and procedures" that satisfy "the standards of

14. The attorney prepared the note "in the format of a receipt." In re Wallace, 518 A.2d
740, 740-42 (N.J. 1986) (suspending the attorney for six months); see also Theobald v. Byers,
13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (attorneys neglected to inform clients of the need
to record the mortgage); Silver v. George, 618 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that it is a "per se violation of an attorney's duty for him to draw a note which is on its face
usurious"); In re Sheridan, 813 A.2d 449, 450 (N.H. 2002) (repeated failure to draft acceptable
articles of incorporation); DeStaso v. Condon Resnick, LLP, 936 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (App. Div.
2011) (stating that a legal malpractice action "may be based upon the creation of a [usurious]
loan document").
15. Degen v. Steinbrink, 195 N.Y.S. 810, 814 (App. Div. 1922). "If the attorney [was]
not competent to skillfully and properly perform the work," the court said, "he should not
[have] undertake[n] the service." Id. "The law governing the creation of liens on personal
property by chattel mortgages is statute law. This every lawyer should know, and, further,
that . . . [those laws differ from state to state] as to form of the instrument, . . . the form of

acknowledgement, and . . other requirements." Id. at 813-14. "[T]o prepare documents that
have no legal potency, by reason of their lack of compliance with simple statutory
requirements, is . . a negligent discharge of [the attorney's] duty ..... Id. at 814; see also
Berman v. Rubin, 227 S.E.2d 802, 805 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) ("[T]he attorney may breach his
duty towards his client when, after undertaking to accomplish a specific result, . . .he then fails
to comply with prescribed statutory formalities .... ); Marom v. Anselmo, 933 N.Y.S.2d 744,
745 (App. Div. 2011) (client stated valid malpractice claim by alleging attorney "failed to
structure the [client's] $500,000 investment" as a secured loan when the attorney had agreed to
do so). Compare Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 690 (Cal. 1961) (excusing from liability an
attorney who drafted a trust that violated the rule against perpetuities, stating that "an attorney
of ordinary skill acting under the same circumstances might well have" made the mistake),
with Temple Hoyne Buell Found. v. Holland & Hart, 851 P.2d 192, 199 (Colo. App. 1992)
(finding issue of fact on whether attorney breached duty by failing to ascertain that the rule
against perpetuities could apply to an option contract), and Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d
30, 33 (Iowa 1982) (barring beneficiaries' malpractice claims because they should have known
a trust violated the rule against perpetuities).
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competent practitioners."1 6 The "required attention and preparation" varies
depending on the stakes of the transaction, as "complex transactions
ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser
complexity and consequence."' 7 Simply put, the attorney must act diligently
in effectuating the planning and execution stages of the representation, a task
which requires the attorney to gather sufficient factual information, plan an
appropriate transaction, and effectively execute the planned transaction.
B. Planning
The planning phase sets the stage for the entire transaction. During that
time, the attorney develops an understanding of the client's goals and the
factual circumstances at hand." A solid grasp of the client's objectives and
individual circumstances is integral to the success of the representation, as it
allows the attorney to plan the transaction in a manner that achieves that
intent.1 9 A flawed factual investigation can undermine even the most vital
goals of the representation. Take, for example, a scenario where the client
wishes to structure an investment involving a real estate venture as a secured
loan to an entity, and the attorney instead drafts the documents to provide
the client with only a membership interest in the entity. 20 If a default later
occurs, such a critical mistake can effectively deprive the client of a
significant part of the value of the transaction, if not all. 21
With a refined understanding of the client's goals, the attorney can
structure the transaction in the most beneficial manner. 22 As part of this

16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
17. Id. Lawyers have "an obligation to exercise care in determining the effect of [any]
agreement" that their clients are to sign. Collas v. Garnick, 624 A.2d 117, 121 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993).
18. Dahm, supra note 5, at 100 (stating that a transactional attorney "must understand
every transaction from the client's perspective, at least to the extent that he/she recognizes
what goals and objectives the client wants to achieve and what risks the client wants to
avoid").
19. Gerry W. Beyer, Avoiding the Estate Planning "Blue Screen of Death" Common
Non-Tax Errors and How to Prevent Them, 1 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 61, 79-80
(2008) ("Failure to obtain relevant facts makes it difficult or impossible to draft an appropriate
estate plan. A client may not reveal important information merely because the attorney did not
ask; the client may not realize the material's significance.").
20. Marom v. Anselmo, 933 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745 (App. Div. 2011).
21. Id. (stating that client lost his $500,000 investment).
22. More favorable structuring may take the form of "a more advantageous agreement"
or, in some cases, no agreement at all, if the attorney discovers information that makes the
transaction disadvantageous to the client's interests. See Viner v. Sweet, 70 P.3d 1046, 1050
(Cal. 2003).
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planning process, the attorney must evaluate alternative structures that may
better achieve the client's objectives, weighing the benefits and drawbacks
of the various means of accomplishing the client's intent.23 This step is most
imperative when the law actually prevents the client from effectuating his or
her desired result through the proposed structure, such as where a client
wishes to make a certain testamentary disposition in contravention of the
state constitution.24
Even when the suggested transactional structure can accomplish the
client's basic objective, other devices may effectuate the client's wishes in a
less onerous manner. Commonly, tax implications can and should drive the
choice between alternative structures. 25 For example, one attorney failed to
advise his client that she could avoid paying estate taxes by disclaiming an
inheritance. 26 Another attorney committed a more blatant oversight when he
recommended that a client make significant lifetime gifts in order to
minimize her estate tax liability. 27 When the client died, the gifts were added
back into her estate, triggering "an increase of $238,000 in tax liability. "28
Within the chosen structure, the attorney must also think critically to
anticipate and avoid contingencies that may undermine the client's intent.
These contingencies can include both the possibility of unexpected factual
occurrences and the application of legal principles which may sabotage the
client's objectives. Factual scenarios can run the gamut, ranging from the

23. "It is not enough simply to follow a client's instructions, for a client cannot foresee
or be expected to foresee the great variety of legal problems that may arise." In re Wallace,
518 A.2d 740, 742 (N.J. 1986) (citing In re Lanaza, 322 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1974)); see also
Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 721 (Ct. App. 1979) ("[A]n attorney has a duty to
avoid involving his client in murky areas of the law if research reveals alternative courses of
conduct. At least he should inform his client of uncertainties and let the client make the
decision.").
24. Lorraine v. Grover, Ciment, Weinstein & Stauber, P.A., 467 So. 2d 315, 319 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (dismissing suit against attorney because client's intent to transfer a life
estate could not have been accomplished regardless of how the lawyer drafted the will).
25. TINA L. STARK, DRAFTING CONTRACTS: How AND WHY LAWYERS Do WHAT
THEY Do 410 (2d ed. 2013) ("In more sophisticated transactions, [tax] issues might require the
transaction's structure to be changed or the deal to be abandoned.").
26. The attorney's "duty to inform [the client] of the right to disclaimer compelled him
to ascertain if executing a disclaimer was in his client's interest or, at a minimum, advise her
of the existence or significance of a disclaimer." Sims v. Hall, 592 S.E.2d 315, 320 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2003); see also Linck v. Barokas & Martin, 667 P.2d 171, 173-74 (Alaska 1983) (finding
a valid claim where attorneys did not advise clients of right to disclaim interest in estate,
resulting in increased estate tax liability); Kinney v. Shinholser, 663 So. 2d 643, 646-47 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (finding an issue of fact as to whether attorneys breached their duty of
care by failing to advise clients of consequences of failing to disclaim power of appointment).
27. Peterson v. Wallach, 764 N.E.2d 19, 21 (111. 2002).
28. Id-
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obvious to the practically unpredictable. 29 in one case, an attorney faced a
negligence claim after he drafted a will that failed to address the possibility
that the testators might die within thirty days of each other without perishing
in a common disaster.30 Attorneys must likewise be attuned to the potential
effects of legal maneuvers by individuals or the application by courts of
legal doctrines, which differ considerably in complexity. Again, the estate
planning realm is rich with examples, from needing to calculate the effect of
a spousal-share election on a client's estate plan31 to considering the
undermining impact of including a general power of appointment in favor of
a spouse in a trust instrument that otherwise sought to avoid apportionment
of trust property to that spouse. 32
C. Execution
In addition to thoroughly planning in accordance with the law and their
clients' unique circumstances, attorneys must properly execute transactions
by drafting the requisite documents and ensuring they are free of errors that
might derail the intended outcome. 33 The pitfalls awaiting drafters in the
execution stage vary widely, ranging from overlooking typographical errors
to incorporating latent ambiguities in the key provisions of the document.
Although many typos and omissions are harmless, causing nothing more
than embarrassment for the drafter, others may generate significant

29. See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 19, at 81 ("The prudent attorney must recognize
situations that are likely to inspire a will contest and take steps to reduce the probability of a
will contest and the chances of its success.").
30. Ogle v. Fuiten, 445 N.E.2d 1344, 1348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (allowing plaintiffs to
proceed on a negligence claim).
31. Johnson v. Sandler, Balkin, Hellman, & Weinstein, P.C., 958 S.W.2d 42, 45-46,
53-54 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (finding an issue of material fact as to the attorney's negligence).
A California attorney overlooked another such issue when he erroneously advised his client
that her husband's retirement benefits were separate property, and the court held him liable for
negligence. Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975) ("The major authoritative reference
works which attorneys routinely consult . . . uniformly indicated . . . that vested retirement

benefits earned during marriage were generally subject to community treatment."). And
another attorney breached his duty of care when he failed to address his client's impending
marriage in her will after she told him she intended to marry, but still desired to leave all her
property to her daughters. Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 165 (Cal. 1969) ("A reasonably
prudent attorney should appreciate the consequences of a post-testamentary marriage . . and
use good judgment to avoid them if the testator so desires.").
32. The attorney's error caused the spouse to incur state inheritance taxes on the entirety
of the trust property plus federal gift taxes when she disclaimed the property to prevent its
inclusion in her estate. Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. Rptr. 514, 516-17 (Ct. App. 1976).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
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disruptions and questions regarding the effect of documents.3 4 For example,
one attorney overlooked mortgage language that dramatically understated
the amount of the secured interest,35 while another neglected to fill in a
blank entirely on a form land contract.3 6 Others have overlooked language
that is clearly inappropriate for the current transaction, like the attorney who
used a form to prepare a trust but forgot to remove the phrase "per stirpes,"
even though the settlor intended to distribute the trust's assets only to her
then-living siblings.3 7
The most obvious and critical errors often occur where the drafter uses
legally deficient language or excludes an essential provision.38 The former
category encompasses such plain errors as drafting a usurious promissory
note. 39 The latter often ensnares knowledgeable attorneys who simply forget

34. Beyer, supra note 19, at 82 ("Major errors-a misplaced decimal point in a legacy
or an important provision omitted and seemingly minor errors-misspelling of a
beneficiary's name-may become the focus of later litigation.").
35. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 573
N.Y.S.2d 981, 984, 987 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that the client stated a viable breach of
contract claim against the attorney when the mortgage identified the client's secured interest as
$92,885.00, rather than $92,885,000).
36. Behnke v. Radtke, 222 N.W.2d 686, 687, 689 (Wis. 1974) (holding that the client
could proceed on a negligence claim against an attorney who neglected to fill in the blank for
the insurance amount in a form land contract, and a fire later destroyed the property); see also
In re Addison, 611 S.E.2d 914, 915-17 (2005) (disciplining an attorney who drafted
conveyance documents with incorrect real property descriptions).
37. In re Lock Revocable Living Tr., 123 P.3d 1241, 1249-51 (Haw. 2005). Because all
but two of the settlor's siblings predeceased her, under a distribution of equal shares, the two
survivors would split the res, while a per stirpes distribution would apportion one-eighth of the
assets to each sibling, "with the surviving children of any predeceased sibling taking the share
of the deceased parent in equal shares." Id. at 1244. Fortunately for the survivors, the court
interpreted the document to mandate a distribution in equal shares to the surviving siblings. Id.
at 1251.
38. Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239, 244 (La. 1972);
Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208, 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) ("In order to advise a client
adequately, a lawyer is obligated to scrutinize any contract which the client is to execute and
thereafter must disclose to the client the full import of the instrument and any possible
consequences which might arise therefrom."); Collas v. Garnick, 624 A.2d 117, 121 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993) (stating that lawyers have "an obligation to exercise care in determining the
effect of [any] agreement" that their clients are to sign).
39. Silver v. George, 618 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980) ("[I]t is a per se
violation of an attorney's duty for him to draw a note which is on its face usurious."); DeStaso
v. Condon Resnick, LLP, 936 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (App. Div. 2011) (stating that a legal
malpractice action "may be based upon the creation of a [usurious] loan document"); see also
Malik v. Beal, 864 N.Y.S.2d 153, 154-55 (App. Div. 2008) (allowing malpractice claim when
attorney purportedly failed to employ language to obligate seller of real property to deliver
certificates of occupancy to client-buyer).
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to include client requests such as a specific gift in a will, 40 or omit common

provisions like a residuary clause. 41 Or, similarly, the attorney may fail to
ensure that payments under a divorce decree qualify as tax alimony by
neglecting to include a statement terminating the payments upon the death of
the recipient. 42

Blatant language defects are relatively easy to avoid, as they are easily
discovered. They represent the most basic failures to accomplish the planned
transaction. 43 More subtle deficiencies occur when the drafter includes all
necessary provisions that might accomplish the client's intent if considered
in isolation, but the document as a whole falls short. These flaws exist
because of the well-known principle of interpreting legal instruments as a
whole, rather than each provision in isolation. 44 The interrelation of the
provisions, rather than substantive deficiencies in any individual paragraph,
spawns these defects. 45

40. Hale v. Groce, 744 P.2d 1289, 1292-93 (Or. 1987); see also M&R Ginsburg, LLC
v. Segal, Goldman, Mazzotta & Siegel, P.C., 934 N.Y.S.2d 269, 269-71 (App. Div. 2011)
(allowing a negligence claim where the attorney purportedly failed to include in a contract for
sale of real property a client-requested restriction prohibiting purchasers from operating a
pharmacy).
41. Young v. Williams, 645 S.E.2d 624, 626 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (attorney admitted
that failure to include a residuary clause in a will violated standard of care); see also Dahlin v.
Jenner & Block, L.L.C., No. 01 C 1725, 2002 WL 31804458, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2002)
(finding an issue of fact as to whether the lawyer acted negligently in failing to include, in a
lease, a provision shifting tax payments from the landlord to the tenant); Escape Airports
(USA), Inc. v. Kent, Beatty & Gordon, LLP, 913 N.Y.S.2d 47, 48-49 (App. Div. 2010)
(refusing to dismiss claim that the attorney acted negligently in failing to include a provision in
a lease allowing the client to terminate the agreement if the landlord curtailed the client's right
to occupy certain space); Wittich v. Wallach, 607 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (App. Div. 1994)
(permitting the client to proceed on claim that the attorney acted negligently in failing to
include a non-disturbance provision in a real property lease).
42. See Wolens v. Comm'r, 114 T.C.M. (CCH) 607, at *6 (2017). Although the courts
will look to state law to ascertain whether the payments will extend beyond the recipient's
death, if the divorce decree expressly provides that they will terminate at the payee's death, the
IRS will generally consider them tax alimony without further inquiry (assuming the payments
satisfy the other requirements). See id.
43. See Badik v. Murphy, 555 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207-08 (App. Div. 1990) (allowing the
client to proceed on claim that the attorney erroneously drafted lease to include option of the
tenant to purchase, rather than option of the landlord to sell).
44. Bamdad Mech. Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 586 F. Supp. 551, 555 (D. Del. 1984),
vacated, 760 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1985) ("In upholding the intentions of the parties, a court must
construe the agreement as a whole, giving effect to all provisions therein."); E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 1985) (citing State v. Dabson, 217
A.2d 497, 500 (Del. 1966)).
45. E.L du Pont de Nemours, 498 A.2d at 1113 (citing Stemerman v. Ackerman, 184
A.2d 28, 34 (Del. Ch. 1962)) ("[T]he meaning which arises from a particular portion of an
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Such documentary defects can take several forms. Drafters pressed for
time may prepare documents with inconsistencies between provisions, often
buried in lines of lengthy text, or fall victim to incorrect cross-references
altered through several rounds of back-and-forth negotiations. 46 Faults of a
more nuanced nature occur when one provision has an unintended
interpretive effect on another. In many cases, any resulting ambiguity
remains undiscovered, part of the great heap of contracts simply tossed
aside, never to be read again, or the ambiguity is so trivial as to cause no
concern. But sometimes the question of interpretation strikes at the heart of
the matter, such that the document no longer accomplishes the client's
objective. 47 In those more extreme instances, the client stands to lose the
benefit of the bargain, and the drafter faces liability for negligence. 48
Integral to the proper execution of documents is the need to supervise all
non-lawyers who contribute to the transaction's effectuation. 49 In many law
offices, paralegals, law clerks, and legal assistants play a significant role in
the document preparation process.o Delegation unbridles the attorney from
mundane tasks and facilitates low-cost legal services." At the same time,
however, the attorney still bears the responsibility to ensure that the final
work product reflects and properly effectuates the client's intent.5 2 In one
noteworthy case, a lawyer's secretary inserted language in a deed contrary to
the express instructions of a long-time client.53 After the lawyer failed to
notice the inclusion, the court held him liable for negligence.5 4

agreement cannot control the meaning of the entire agreement where such inference runs
counter to the agreement's overall scheme or plan.").
46. Attorneys must also guard against inconsistencies between separate documents in
the same transaction. See, e.g., Becker v. Port Dock Four, Inc., 752 P.2d 1235, 1236 (Or. Ct.
App. 1988) (finding the attorney negligent after he drafted a land sale contract to include
parking spaces and an easement but failed to include those in the deed).
47. See Kushner v. McLarty, 300 S.E.2d 531 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
48. See id.
49. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
50. See Paul R. Tremblay, Shadow Lawyering: Nonlawyer Practice Within Law Firms,
85 IND. L.J. 653, 656-57 (2010).
51. See In re Op. No. 24 of Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 607 A.2d 962,
963, 967 (N.J. 1992) (stating that paralegals benefit "the public in the form of reduced legal
fees").
52. See In re Evans, 657 S.E.2d 752, 753 (S.C. 2008); In re Avant, 603 S.E.2d 295, 296
(Ga. 2004); Harold A. Segall, Drafting: An Essential Skill, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 751, 752
(2003) ("[Lawyers] must concentrate on reading a final draft as if [they] were reading the
document for the first time .... There is no use in blaming mistakes on the secretary or typist.
It is up to the draftsman to correct mistakes.").
53. McWhorter, Ltd. v. Irvin, 267 S.E.2d 630, 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
54. Id. at 632.
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The execution phase does not end when the documents are drafted,
however. Even the most impeccably crafted document will not effectively
carry out the client's intent if the attorney overlooks any additional
requirements. Consider the familiar examples of recording a mortgage and
complying with testamentary formalities. In the mortgage context, the
lender's attorney dutifully drafts the document, and the requisite parties sign
at closing. But the attorney's job is not done, as he or she must still ensure
the mortgage is recorded, either by doing so personally, assigning the task to
a reliable third party, or at least informing the client of the need to record.5 5
Formalities of testamentary conveyances function in a similar manner. In
most states, a will must be written and signed by the testator and two
witnesses (plus a varying number of additional formalities, depending on the
state). 56 Failure to satisfy those requirements often renders the gift
ineffectual, and the property passes through intestacy, the eventual result of
which may or may not reflect the testator's original intent. 5 7
D.

Consultationand Explanation

Planning and executing a transaction involves a dynamic process-it is
less a sequential affair than a back-and-forth exercise, which reflects the
shifting nature of the transaction and the evolving needs of the client. In both
simple and complex engagements, the client may be confused by what the
documents accomplish and how they protect the client's interest. Without a
proper explanation of the client's legal situation and options, as well as the
implications of the transaction on his or her interest, the client is hardpressed to make fully informed decisions. To mitigate these concerns, as a
corollary to the duty of competence, the attorney has a duty to consult and
advise the client and to explain the transaction.58

55. See Theobald v. Byers, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 865 (Ct. App. 1961) (the attorneys
neglected to inform their clients of the need to record the mortgage); see also Edme v.
Tanenbaum, 855 N.Y.S.2d 596, 596-97 (App. Div. 2008) (permitting action against the
attorney who allegedly failed to "set up and maintain an escrow account for" certain funds of
his client intended to pay the client's monthly mortgage obligation).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 (AM. LAW
INST. 1999). For an example of a state statute that mandates a litany of additional formalities,
see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-103(a) (2012).
57. See, e.g., Auric v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 327 (Wis. 1983) (lack of
second witness signature on will rendered invalid a $25,000 specific bequest to the testator's
brother); see also John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A
Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in ProbateLaw, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1987).
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016). "One of an
attorney's basic functions is to advise. Liability can exist because the attorney failed to provide
advice." Nichols v. Keller, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 608 (Ct. App. 1993). "There is also a very
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In broad terms, the duty of consultation and explanation obligates the
attorney to use care in keeping the client apprised of significant matters
relating to the transaction.59 This generalization breaks down into two
interconnected components: reasonable consultation and reasonable
explanation. The former requires the attorney to "reasonably consult with the
client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be
accomplished," which is to say the attorney must seek the client's input
where appropriate. 60 The latter similarly entails an explanation of the
"matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make
informed decisions regarding the representation," meaning the attorney must
give the client sufficient information to determine how to proceed. 61
Sometimes, the client will request an explanation of the alternative
approaches, the significance of a provision, or the effect of a document. 62
However, when the client never directly seeks such an explanation, the
attorney must use his or her judgment to determine when a consultation and
explanation is truly necessary. Certain decisions fundamentally affect the
client's interest and clearly require the attorney to seek the client's input,
explain the relative considerations, and let the client make the final
decision. 63 The fundamental category might include the determination of

practical reason for such explanations to the client: no lawyer wants to work hard taking action
that a client has no use for, and no client wants to get a bill for such work." Brook Boyd, Smart
Checklists and the FutureofReal Estate Law Practice, 28 PROB. & PROP. 34, 36 (2014).
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(2) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
60. Id.; see also Hricik, supra note 5, at 260 ("Lawyers have a fundamental duty to
communicate with clients."). Attorneys owe their clients a "duty to review and explain . . the
legal import and consequences which would result from" signing any agreement. Lowry v.
Lowry, 393 S.E.2d 141, 145 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). "[L]awyers should make their best efforts
to ensure that the client does not make a decision until the client has been informed of the
relevant considerations." Rice v. Poppe, 881 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Neb. 2016).
61. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016). Attorneys
should "volunteer opinions when necessary to further the client's objectives. [They] need not
advise and caution of every possible alternative, but only of those that may result in adverse
consequences if not considered." Nichols, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608. The degree of explanation
"is a function of the specific situation and the known predilections of the client." Conklin v.
Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996).
62. See Cicorelli v. Capobianco, 453 N.Y.S.2d 21, 22 (App. Div. 1982) (finding that the
attorney breached duty of care when he incorrectly advised his clients that they had no further
obligations under a contract); Gorski v. Smith, 812 A.2d 683, 694-95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(holding that the attorney breached duty of care by failing to explain to his clients the
consequences of a warranty and erroneously advising them that they could terminate the
agreement).
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016); see also
Cottone v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, No. A-0420-12T4, 2014 WL 4287002, at *12 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Sept. 2, 2014) (transactional attorneys have a duty to "review the written agreement
with the client [] to determine that the client underst[ands] the material terms that might
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whether a newly-formed LLC will be member- or manager-managed, 64
whereas a client might not expect or care to provide input on how "Business
Day" is defined in an operating agreement. 65
Together these duties supply guiding principles for effective
transactional representation: sufficient knowledge, suitable planning, sound
execution, and adequate explanation where appropriate. Although at first
glance they seem straightforward enough, these deceptively complex
touchstones engender a corresponding set of risks in transactional
representations, pitfalls which are often difficult to predict, and timeconsuming to reliably avoid. Indeed, the above described cases are merely a
fraction of the already diminished amount that survive the privity bar66 or

reasonably affect [his] decision to execute it"). "An attorney . . must advise a client of the
risks of the transaction in terms sufficiently clear to enable the client to assess the client's
risks. The care must be commensurate with the risks of the undertaking and tailored to the
needs and sophistication of the client." Conklin, 678 A.2d at 1069; see also Wong v. Wu, 683
N.Y.S.2d 249, 249-50 (App. Div. 1999) (allowing a claim against the attorney for failing to
advise the real estate purchasers of their right to terminate upon the seller's nonperformance at
closing and as to the omission of a time-is-of-the-essence clause).
64. See Gianfranco A. Pietrafesa, Avoiding Legal Malpractice in LLC Formations,N.J.
LAW. 12, 14 (2016), https://www.archerlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Pietrafesa%/
20-%20Avoiding%20Legal%20Malpractice%20in%20LLC%20Formations.pdf
("Without
knowing the economics, and without explaining the different consequences to clients, an
attorney may draft an operating agreement that has unintended results.").
65. See Preferred Fragrance, Inc. v. Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC, No. 15 Civ.
1293 BMC, 2015 WL 6143612, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2015) (expressing concerns that
imposing a duty to explain simple provisions would generate endless malpractice claims,
regardless of whether the provision was "substantively unreasonable"). Cf Hackers Inc. v.
Palmer, 79 Pa. D. & C.4th 485, 488-89 (Pa. Ct. Common Pleas 2006) (finding an issue of fact
as to negligence of the attorney who allegedly failed to explain "clause of [an] asset purchase
agreement that denoted what liabilities were assumed").
66. Some states have retained a strict privity bar. See, e.g., Robinson v. Benton, 842 So.
2d 631, 634 (Ala. 2002) (dismissing a negligence claim of the devisee against the attorney,
stating that "an intended beneficiary has no standing to bring a legal-malpractice action against
an attorney because there is no privity between the beneficiary and attorney, and in the absence
of privity, the attorney owes no duty to the beneficiary"); Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d 575,
576 (Tex. 1996) ("[A]ttorney who negligently drafts a will or trust agreement owes [no] duty
of care to persons intended to benefit under the will or trust."). Others have permitted nonclient beneficiaries to sue attorneys "only if the client's intent, as expressed in the [document],
is frustrated." Bradley E.S. Fogel, Estate Planning Malpractice: Special Issues in Need of
Special Care, GPSOLO (May 2005), https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publiations
/lawtrends newsjpracticearea_e_newsletterhome/0506_estate estateplanning.html (citing
Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen and Heilbronner, 612 So. 2d 1378, 1380 (Fla.
1993)); see also Glover v. Southard, 894 P.2d 21, 24 (Colo. App. 1995). Still other courts
apply broader, more flexible tests to determine whether non-clients may maintain a cause of
action against the attorney. See, e.g., Blair v. Ing, 21 P.3d 452, 464-68 (Haw. 2001); Auric v.
Cont'l Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 326-27 (Wis. 1983).
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the statute of limitations to reach the appellate level. 67 Few attorneys wish to

navigate such perils with only their wits, a blank Word document, and a
blinking cursor. 68 Instead, they have long looked to precedential drafting
tools for assistance, the nature of which has evolved throughout the
centuries.69
III. THE EVOLVING INTERFACE OF LAWYERS AND TECHNOLOGY

Innovation is no stranger to the practice of law. As the techniques
employed by attorneys and the law itself have become increasingly complex,
so too have the resources developed to assist transactional attorneys to
increase their efficiency and to navigate drafting hazards. 70 The staples in
the lawyer's toolkit have advanced over centuries from rudimentary
collections of standard documents intended to be hand copied to the present
day vast array of electronic precedents that are easily edited, instantly
shared, and quickly customized for the current transaction.
A.

The Many Forms of the Form

In the distant past, lawyers and their clerks, like everyone else,
handwrote everything. 7 ' Beginning in the mid-1400s, formbooks heavily

67. See, e.g., Snyder v. Heidelberger, 953 N.E.2d 415, 421 (Ill. 2011) (dismissing as
time barred, a widow's malpractice action against the attorney for allegedly negligent
preparation of a quitclaim deed that failed to convey certain real estate to her and her husband
as joint tenants with right of survivorship); Dearborn Animal Clinic, P.A. v. Wilson, 806 P.2d
997, 999-1001 (Kan. 1991) (holding statute of limitations barred the malpractice claim against
the attorney who allegedly failed to draft asset purchase agreement to require buyers to
purchase stock, and instead gave them an option to purchase); Goldberg v. Bosworth, 215
N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (dismissing the claim against the attorney who permitted
devisee to act as a witness to a will).
68. See DAVID MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE 102 (1982) ("No
one who makes frequent use of the law will ever live long enough to live without forms.").
69. See Susan M. Chesler & Karen J. Sneddon, Tales from a Form Book: Stock Stories
and Transactional Documents, 78 MONT. L. REv. 237, 243 (2017) ("The use of form
documents . . .by lawyers is perhaps as old as the law itself.").
70. See M.H. Hoeflich, Law Blanks & Form Books: A Chapter in the Early History of
Document Production, 11 GREEN BAG 2D 189, 191 (2008) ("The repetitive nature of much of
legal drafting makes the use of forms economically efficient.").
71. PETER BUTT & RICHARD CASTLE, MODERN LEGAL DRAFTING 17 (2001) ("Before
the invention of printing, legal documents were necessarily handwritten."). A brief perusal of
the registry of deeds in most U.S. counties yields numerous handwritten documents conveying
legal title to property. Indeed, many eighteenth and nineteenth century handwritten indentures,
stock certificates, and court petitions remain in circulation, if not legal effect. See, e.g., NALC
Letters and Documents, HISTORIC INDENTURES, http://historicindentures.com/category/robert-
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influenced much of this handwritten drafting, as they eased the repetitive
task of crafting reliable language in routine matters. 72 By the 1920s, electric
typewriters appeared in more and more law offices, virtually eliminating the
arduous task of copying formbook language by hand. 73 The mid-1960s gave
the legal profession word-processing systems, which allowed lawyers to
store data and easily edit documents.74 With the incremental advancement of
word memory functions through the second half of the twentieth century,
formbooks began gathering dust on bookshelves as lawyers increasingly

morris/nalc-letters-and-documents/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2018). This state of affairs remained
until the 1900s, when the first feasible electronic typewriters emerged. MARIANNE FORRESTER
MUNDAY, OPPORTUNITIES IN WORD PROCESSING 6 (1985); see also BUTT & CASTLE, supra
note 71, at 18 (citing DAVID MELLINKOFF, LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 86 (1963)) ("After
William Caxton set up the first printing press in England in 1476, printed works soon
proliferated. Not much printing, though, found its way unto private legal documents. Until the
typewriter took over in the twentieth century, legal documents were for the most part
handwritten by clerks who were often poorly educated and poorly paid.").
72. ADAM FREEDMAN, THE PARTY OF THE FIRST PART: THE CURIOUS WORLD OF
LEGALESE 25 (2007) ("Almost as soon as Gutenberg's first Bible rolled off the press (1455),
English lawyers were putting together formbooks, that is, collections of sample contracts,
pleadings, and other documents that had already passed muster with some court or another.
Provided that one copied the form verbatim, no sporting judge could object."); see also Alfred
L. Brophy & Douglas Thie, Land, Slaves, and Bonds: Trust and Probate in the Pre-Civil War
Shenandoah Valley, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 345, 380 (2016); Hoeflich, supra note 70, at 191;
Karen J. Sneddon, In the Name of God, Amen: Language in Last Wills and Testaments, 29
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 665, 698-99 (2011). The comments of a fifteenth-century English judge
illustrated the credibility the judiciary attributed to even the earliest formbooks: "Sir, the law is
as I say it is, and so it has been laid down ever since the law began; and we have several set
forms which are held as law, and so held and used for good reason, though we cannot at
present remember that reason." WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW (3d ed. 1923) (citing YB 36 Hen. VI, 25-26 (1458) (Fortescue, C.J.)); see also Graybill
v. Graybill, 14 Pa. D. & C. 382, 384 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1930) ("An examination of the form books,
while not being recognized as stating the law, gives some indication of what the general
practice is .... ).
73. The first successful manual typewriter was invented in 1867, but innovators did not
create a "feasible" electric typewriter until the 1920s. MUNDAY, supra note 71, at 6-7. Typing
alleviated some of the potential errors in transcribing form language. GEO. CARL MARES, THE
HISTORY OF THE TYPEWRITER: BEING AN ILLUSTRATED ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN, RISE, AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRITING MACHINE 12 (1909) ("Writers on office management, and

bookkeepers all declare that the transcription of figures from one record to another is the most
prolific source of errors . . . .").
74. Word processors did not truly catch on until the 1970s, when businesses came to
realize the full range of possibilities. MUNDAY, supra note 71, at vi-vii ("Many experts predict
that during the next decade, word processing systems will replace the typewriter for most
office uses. Given that scenario, a working knowledge of word processing will be essential for
anyone who wishes to successfully compete in the business world.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss3/5

18

Foster and Lawson: When to Praise the Machine: The Promise and Perils of Automated T
2018]

WHEN TO PRAISE THE MACHINE

615

relied on forms and previous agreements saved on their computers. 7 5 At the
same time, specialized document assembly systems for transactional
attorneys began appearing, first as locally installed systems and later as
internet-based resources. 76 Now the profession is in the midst of a
potentially promising, but as of yet unrealized, restructuring through the
advent of artificial intelligence.7 7
Simply starting from a form document benefits transactional attorneys in
numerous ways. Forms serve as checklists of important provisions,
reminding attorneys to include common clauses even if they simply glance
over the headings.78 This, in turn, reduces the occurrence of forgetful
oversights in the drafting process and lessens the need for attorneys to
mentally catalogue important inclusions in document preparation. 79 The predrafted language also allows attorneys to save time otherwise spent
generating repetitive language and, depending on the form's reliability, can
provide a measure of assurance of the final document's legal sufficiency.so
In addition, the widespread use of form language among practitioners
facilitates consistent interpretation of similar documents and allows
attorneys and clients to navigate the document more efficiently." In the
business context, standardized language promotes productivity in the
negotiation process by allowing each side to more easily understand the
document's effect and streamlining bargaining points.82 Companies can
manage their contractual commitments in a more orderly, cost-effective

75. See Hoeflich, supra note 70, at 200 ("As word-processing technology moved into
the digital era, ... the traditional form book . . at last became obsolete.... Today, a lawyer
will rarely purchase a form book, but both compilations of forms and individual
forms . . .downloadable from the Web remain much in use.").
76. See Darryl R. Mountain, DisruptingConventional Law Firm Business Models Using
Document Assembly, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 170, 172-73 (2007).
77. See Julie Sobowale, How Artificial Intelligence is Transforming the Legal
Profession, AM. BAR Ass'N J. (Apr. 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_
artificial intelligenceistransformingthe legaljprofession.
78. See Dahm, supra note 5, at 96-97.
79. See Claire A. Hill, Why ContractsAre Written in "Legalese", 77 CHI. KENT L. REV.
59, 63 (2001) ("Given the complex nature of the task, and the quick turnaround time typically
required, even the most experienced lawyer would have difficulty remembering every step and
detail; the form is a useful reminder.").
80. See STARK, supra note 25, at 411 ("[I]f the precedent is a good one, using it will
reduce errors and improve a contract's quality."); Hill, supra note 79, at 63 ("A new product,
custom-crafted for the client from a form, can be produced quickly, and at far lower cost than a
product crafted from scratch.").
81. See William E. Foster, Enduring Design for Business Entities, UTAH L. REV. 955,
1000 (2015).
82. See id. at 1001.
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manner, enabling them to retain value from obligations others owe to
them. 83

When coupled with word-processing systems, the practical usefulness of
forms multiplies. Attorneys can easily customize and save form documents,
which are retrievable with only a few clicks.84 Using the editing capabilities
of Word, they can insert placeholders throughout the document and use the
find-and-replace function to insert names and other individualized
information in mere minutes. 5 For unique agreements, they can draw on
multiple documents using the copy-and-paste function-one useful
provision from one agreement, a second from another document, and so on.
Before law offices were connected to the internet, attorneys' drafting
tools were often limited to standardized forms in published formbooks and
whatever precedents were available from transactions involving lawyers in
the same office. 8 6 The intemet unleashed a universe of readily available
forms by allowing attorneys to instantly share documents through email and
to access a wide variety of templates electronically stored throughout the
world. 17 In some important ways, this shift fundamentally altered the
practice of many transactional attorneys, who previously had to cobble
together language from limited and familiar databases and who now could
instantly locate precedents for nearly any conceivable transaction.8

83. See Mark R. Patterson, Standardizationof Standard-Form Contracts: Competition
and Contract Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 342-43 (2010) (describing the
benefits of contract standardization in lessening transaction costs and providing a contract
"whose meaning and interpretation is more certain").
84. Word processors contributed many editing and formatting tools attorneys now take
for granted: font, font size, and "paragraph attributes such as justification, spacing before and
after, [and] automatic numbering." David Kiefer & Marc Lauritsen, Recent Developments in
Automating Legal Documents, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1091, 1092-93 (2002). Such
developments also included scrolling, word wrap, insertion, deletion, search and replace,
margins and tabs, and spell-check. MUNDAY, supra note 71, at 27-29.
85. See Marc Lauritsen, Current Frontiers in Legal Drafting Systems 2 (June 2007)
(Working Paper), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/571acb59e707ebff3074f461/t/5946f
le39de4bb69d253380c/1497821669156/CurrentFrontiers.pdf ("A boilerplate document with
placeholders like [plaintiff], [defendant], [court], and [attorney for plaintiff] can thus be
tailored for a given case by replacing those phrases with specific information.").
86. See Austin Coleman Gay, Book Review, 6 TEX. L. REV. 122 (1927) (reviewing
ROBERT W. STAYTON, TEXAS FORM BOOK ANNOTATED (2d ed. 1927)) (stating that the author
"deserves the thanks of the members of the Texas Bar for furnishing them with a
comprehensive, grammatical, and correct set of legal forms").
87. Dahm, supra note 5, at 96 ("Attorneys commonly use standard contracts that were
previously drafted for other clients, they research form books for standard contracts, and they
search the Internet for contracts that have been drafted by other attorneys for clients with
similar transactions.").
88. See Paul E. Washington & Michael Stefanoudakis, The Internet: A Great Resource
for CorporateLawyers, 28 COLO. LAW. 65, 65 (1999) ("The Internet and other online sources
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Yet, that expanded availability has carried with it a potentially
deleterious effect on the quality of transactional representation. The
internet's expansive reach means attorneys and others have access to
unfamiliar documents from obscure sources. With minimal information on
the drafter and often virtually no context for the original transaction,
attorneys risk relying on precedents that are ill-suited for their client's
needs. 89 To be sure, the internet has brought innumerable high-quality forms
within everyone's grasp. 90 But in the great heap of accessible documents,
attorneys also face a new challenge in distinguishing between suitable
precedents and malpractice fodder.
B. Automation
Since the 1970s, computer-based advancements have driven the
evolution of the law practice. The advent of computerized legal research
occurred with the introduction of LEXIS in early 1973 and then Westlaw in
1975.91 For transactional attorneys, specialized document assembly systems
appeared shortly thereafter, beginning in 1978 with the American Bar
Foundation's "ABF Processor." 92 Early document assembly systems
required local software, which forced attorneys to install the program (as
well as any updates) on the firm's system.93 By 1990, these locally based
systems had spread throughout the United States. 94 As that decade
progressed, the internet further augmented the systems' popularity by

are excellent resources for obtaining well-drafted agreements that corporate lawyers may use
to draft similar agreements for their clients.").
89. STARK, supra note 25, at 412-13.
90. See Washington & Stefanoudakis, supra note 88, at 65 ("The primary advantage of
using the Internet is that it is an efficient way to obtain well-drafted precedent.").
91. The Ohio State Bar Association launched the first foray into electronic legal
research in the mid-1960s, when it enlisted the forerunner of LEXIS to explore the issue. See
F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the
Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 573 (2002). While at first LEXIS offered a clearly superior product
to Westlaw, by the mid-1980s, "Westlaw had become an automated research service equal in
power to LEXIS." Id. (citing William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted
Legal Research, 77 LAW L1BR. J. 543, 553-54 (1984)).
92. See James A. Sprowl, Automating the Legal Reasoning Process: A Computer That
Uses Regulations and Statutes to Draft Legal Documents, 4 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 1, 16
(1979).
93. See Steven Keeva, Document Assembly, 76 AM. BAR Ass'N J. SD1 1, SD14 (1990);
Kiefer & Lauritsen, supra note 84, at 1098-99.
94. See Keeva, supra note 93, at SD14. In 1990, one Memphis practitioner predicted
that the "document assembly boom" would "be complete in 10 years." Id. at SDI 1.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 5
618

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 597

allowing attorneys access to the programs through online servers. 95
Importantly, this new online location permitted producers to instantly update
the systems to keep pace with legal developments. 96
Broadly defined, document assembly is an automation technique that
involves the construction of templates into which the program inputs clientspecific information. 97 Most systems use a questionnaire format, in which
the user responds to the program's inquiries, and the program incorporates
the user's responses to generate a final document.98 With the correct
formatting, the systems can produce a range of documents of varying
complexity. 99 Even the ABF Processor could assemble simple wills, divorce
complaints, and intestate probate forms.' 00 And those outputs have only
expanded over time; current document assembly systems can generate
documents ranging from revocable living trusts and pour-over wills to buysell agreements and entity formation documents such as operating
agreements. o

Current document assembly programs take one of two basic forms. Law
firms can program a system to utilize the firm's own forms and to use
questions and answers the firm's attorneys formulate. 0 2 Or the firm can
purchase a pre-built program (whether online or locally installed), which

&

95. See Mountain, supra note 76, at 173 (citing Richard Granat et al., 'Will Document
Automation Disrupt the Legal Profession? A Roundtable Discussion Sponsored by the ABA's
eLawyering Task Force', Loew's Hotel Philadelphia, Oct. 22, 2005)) ("[T]he increasing reach
of the Web makes it more economical to automate a given document.").
96. See Kathryn D. Betts & Kyle R. Jaep, The Dawn of Fully Automated Contract
Drafting: Machine Learning Breathes New Life Into a Decades-OldPromise, 15 DUKE L.
TECH. REv. 216, 222 (2016); see, e.g., Brett Pinegar, Before You Purchase Estate Planning
Software, Read This Article, WEALTHCOUNSEL (Aug. 1, 2017), http://info.wealthcounsel.com/
blog/before-you-purchase-estate-planning-software-read-this-article
("Wealth
Counsel's
software allows [attorneys] to streamline [their] processes by creating accurate, up-to-date,
professional documents. The software is regularly updated to reflect legal and legislative
changes . . . .").
97. See Irene Ng (Huang Ying), The Art of ContractDrafting in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence: A Comparative Study Based on US, UK and Austrian Law 18 (Transatlantic
Tech. L. Forum, Working Paper No. 26, 2017).
98. Kenneth A. Adams & Tim Allen, The Illusion of Quality in ContractDrafting, 248
N.Y.L.J. 11 (July 17, 2012) ("When the user has completed the questionnaire, the system pulls
together and adjusts the preloaded contract language in accordance with instructions included
in the contract language, and the user is presented with the resulting contract as a Word
document or a PDF .... ).
99. See Mark J. Morrise, How Document Assembly Will Benefit Your Law Practice, 8
UTAH B.J. (2d ser.) 14, 15 (1995).
100. See Sprowl, supra note 92.
101. See Pinegar,supra note 96.
102. Introduction, PATHAGORAS, https://www.pathagoras.com/help/introduction.htm?
toc=0&printWindow& (last updated Nov. 1, 2017).
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uses contract material that a commercial producer's attorneys created. 103 A
prominent example of the latter is Wealth Docx, which offers suites of
documents from estate planning to entity formation. 104
Regardless of whether the contract material originates from a law firm
or a commercial entity, the systems' basic question-and-answer format is the
same and encompasses a number of functions. At their most basic level, the
systems operate similar to the find-and-replace function of word-processing
systems by allowing attorneys to enter client information (such as names,
addresses, and birth dates) into new forms in a matter of seconds. 05 A last
will and testament form on a document assembly system, for example,
would contain bracketed placeholders throughout the document, including
[the name of the testator], [the testator's spouse], and so on.1 06 The program
would generate a question based on the contents of each set of brackets, e.g.,
"What is the name of the testator?" and then substitute the user's response
for each corresponding bracket. 0 7
In addition to eliminating the redundant task of inserting names and
dates, these programs facilitate customization by providing optional or
alternative clauses. Each document may contain a number of these clauses,
which can vary in depth and intricacy.'0o In designing the programs to
include alternative and optional clauses, programmers formulate a catalogue
of "blocks or clauses to cover a wide variety of factual scenarios"109 that are
likely to be included in the types of documents the attorney typically drafts.

103. Betts & Jaep, supra note 96, at 219 ("Web-based programs now prevail over those
requiring users to load software on individual devices.").
104. Estate Planning and Business Planning Tools, WEALTHCOUNSEL, https://
www.wealthcounsel.com/software-for-attorneys (last visited Jan. 14, 2018) [hereinafter
WEALTHCOUNSEL].

105. Mountain, supra note 76, at 172 (stating that the "basic functions" of assembly
software "are to replace the cumbersome manual filling in of repetitive documents with
template-based systems where the user answers software-driven interview questions").
106. Sprowl, supra note 92, at 19.
107. See, e.g., Jim Calloway & Diane Ebersole, Magic in Minutes Effective Use of
Document Assembly, LAW PRACTICE TODAY (Sept. 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/law practice today home/law practice today archive/septemberl2/magic-in-mi
nutes.html ("In Pathagoras a lawyer can just pull up the lawyer's own form in Microsoft Word
and replace all of the various variables (names, dates, prescriptions) with the name of the
variable surrounded by brackets. (e.g. replace Betty White with [Client Name].")).
108. Betts & Jaep, supra note 96, at 219.
109. Henry J. Lischer, Jr. et al., What is Document Assembly? Document Assembly
Compared With TraditionalForms of Document Preparation, 16 West's Legal Forms, Estate
Planning § 3.4 ("First, the system designer prepares a catalogue of alternative paragraphs or
clauses ('blocks of text') to cover a wide variety of fact situations that may be necessary for a
document. The author usually will start with his or her own existing forms and, as the need
arises, expand the 'inventory' of clauses to cover a wider variety of fact patterns.").

Published by Scholar Commons, 2018

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 5
620

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 69: 597

The source material can be either a commercial producer's own forms or, if
an attorney is building a document assembly program in-house, the
attorney's own forms and documents. 0 Next, by using the automation
software, the programmer creates a "decision tree ... that links the various
blocks of text together as the circumstances of each situation dictate.""'
To formulate an optional clause, the programmer instructs the system to
include or exclude a single clause depending on the user's response. For
instance, one such decision in a will would be whether to include a provision
instructing the executor of the estate to pay estate taxes out of the estate. 112
The program might ask, "Are the [estate] taxes to be paid out of the res of
the estate?"" 3 If the user typed "yes," the system would insert a
preprogrammed clause instructing the executor to do so.11 4 If, however, the
user typed "no," the system would simply omit that provision." 5
Alternative clauses operate in a similar fashion, except that a user's
answers are attached to two or more different clauses. Consider, for
example, the typical testator's decision of whether to appoint one or multiple
executors.1 16 The system would ask, "Do you wish to name only one
executor, rather than an executor and an alternate executor?"" 7 Based on the
user's responses, the system automatically inserts alternative and optional
clauses, fills in blanks, ensures grammatical consistency, and generates a
first draft of the document."' For example, if the user responded "yes" to
the single executor question, the system would insert the clause appointing
only one executor.11 9 If, on the other hand, the user said "no," it would insert
the clause naming multiple executors. 120
Document assembly systems can use these optional and alternative
clauses to lead the user through multiple layers of variables, which allows
the systems to generate documents of impressive complexity. 121 And the
programs have only become more user-friendly and streamlined since their

110. Mountain, supra note 76, at 172.
111. Lischer et al., supra note 109.
112. Sprowl, supra note 92, at 24; see also Morrise, supra note 99, at 14.
113. Sprowl, supra note 92, at 23-24.
114. Id. at 24.
115. Id.; see also Morrise, supra note 99, at 14.
116. Sprowl, supra note 92, at 24-25.
117. Id.
118. Morrise, supra note 99, at 14.
119. Sprowl, supra note 92, at 25.
120. Id.
121. Betts & Jaep, supra note 96, at 219 ("Each successive answer in the questionnaire
prompts a different series of follow-up questions to tailor the final document to the user's
specific needs, providing for a larger, more customizable logic tree than one only focused on
only a single practice area.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss3/5

24

Foster and Lawson: When to Praise the Machine: The Promise and Perils of Automated T
2018]

WHEN TO PRAISE THE MACHINE

621

inception.1 22 With only a basic understanding of how the program works,
attorneys can use document assembly to generate sophisticated, customized
work product in smaller and smaller increments of time.1 23
Although document assembly systems remain the primary tool for
transactional attorneys seeking automated assistance, recent developments in
artificial intelligence portend accelerated advancements toward automation
in the coming years.1 24 Promising programs include systems for document
drafting,1 25 automated legal research,1 26 automated due diligence and
contract review, 12 and advanced contract management programs.1 28 Many

of these new systems utilize "machine learning." Unlike traditional
document assembly systems, which are completely dependent on hard-coded
instructions that their programmers provide,1 29 machine learning systems

122. See generally Richard S. Granat, Elawyering: Providing More Efficient Legal
Services with Today's Technology, 80 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 20, 26 (2009) ("Traditionally,
document automation has been used by lawyers within the office environment to speed up the
production of documents of all kinds. This is important, but it does not have as dramatic an
effect on the law firm work process as client-centered and Web-enabled document automation.
By moving the document automation process onto the Web and enabling the client to provide
data online without initial lawyer intervention-a major increase in lawyer and client
productivity occurs.").
123. See, e.g., DraftingAssistant-Transactional,THOMSON REUTERS, http://legalsolutio
ns.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/solutions/drafting-assistant/transactional (last visited Feb.
26, 2018) (advertising the system's ability to "[a]void contract drafting errors, [c]ut
proofreading time in half," and "[p]roduce documents that reflect the latest market practice").
124. John 0. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: How Machine
Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services, 82
FORDHAM L. REv. 3041, 3051 (2014) ("We predict that within ten to fifteen years, computerbased services will routinely generate the first draft of most transactional documents.").
125. See, e.g., Kirafor Due Diligence, KIRA, https://kirasystems.com/how-it-works/duediligence (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) [hereinafter KIRA] (stating that Kira "[a]utomatically
finds the provisions that matter in M&A especially in unfamiliar contracts").
126. Most prominent is the ROSS Intelligence system, which "uses the Watson cognitive
computing system to enhance legal research. Users ask legal questions in plain English and
ROSS searches legislation, case law and secondary sources." Julie Sobowale, How Artificial
Intelligence is Transforming the Legal Profession, AM. BAR Ass'N J. (Apr. 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/howartificialintelligenceistransforming the
legal profession.
127. See, e.g., KIRA, supra note 125 (stating that Kira "[a]utomatically finds the
provisions that matter in M&A-especially in unfamiliar contracts").
128. See, e.g., Contract Analyzer, EBREVIA, https://ebrevia.com/ebrevia-contractmanager (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) ("The Contract Analyzer extracts information from
current and legacy contracts to ensure that key contractual data and commitments are not
missed.").
129. Morrise, supra note 99, at 15 ("[T]he lawyer or someone working under the
lawyer's direction must input the forms, identify the blanks, decide what optional or
alternative clauses to add, insert the instructions to the computer, etc.").
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employ algorithms that allow them to independently learn drafting
options.130 As programmers feed them data (i.e., a series of contracts), the
processors review, interact, and learn from those examples.131 Eventually,
the systems can teach themselves "to identify new examples to better fit the
user's liking," such as identifying standard clauses in each contract and
using those provisions to create a model template with "the least amount of
deal-specific, non-standard language available."13 2
One system that uses aspects of machine learning is Bloomberg Law's
"Draft Analyzer" tool.' 33 The system interfaces with EDGAR the SEC's
publicly available database of contracts which allows it to identify "the
prevailing market terms . .. for certain contract provisions ...

"134 This

feature provides attorneys access to language that approximates current
market norms, which the program updates as market trends shift. 3 5 To use
the program, the user must merely upload a document. 3 6 The system then
analyzes the document, drawing on hundreds of precedent documents, and
provides alternative language for provisions throughout the agreement. 137
These suggestions can be highly useful to drafters who take the time to
carefully evaluate each potential alteration. But the user must act cautiously
in determining whether to change his or her language based on the system's
proposed wording, especially when the user inputs a highly unique

130. Irene Ng (Huang Ying), supra note 97, at 21 ("The Al system assesses information
that is fed into it, and subsequently makes inferences based on the data it has received by
attempting to make connections and relationships amongst the different data that it receives.
Upon making the relevant inferences, the Al system will then attempt to predict outcomes.").
131. Betts & Jaep, supra note 96, at 224; see also McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 124, at
3041 ("Intelligent machines will become better and better, both in terms of performance and
cost. And unlike humans, they can work ceaselessly around the clock, without sleep or
caffeine.").
132. Betts & Jaep, supra note 96, at 224, 227; see also McGinnis & Pearce, supra note
124, at 3050 ("[M]achine intelligence will revolutionize the use of legal forms. Most
obviously, machine intelligence will help tailor these forms to meet individual situations.").
133. See Product Help & Walkthrough: Draft Analyzer, BLOOMBERG LAW,
https://www.bna.com/draft-analyzer/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Draft Analyzer].
134. David Lat, The Future of Law and Technology: An Interview with Bloomberg
BNA's David Perla, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 27, 2015, 1:11 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/
2015/08/the-future-of-law-and-technology-an-interview-with-bloomberg-bnas-david-perla/.
135. See DraftAnalyzer, supra note 133 ("Draft Analyzer can reveal just how 'standard'
some language is."). Some argue that these types of systems are fundamentally flawed because
they are unable to discriminate between quality and sub-optimal language. Ken Adams, Some
Thoughts on "Bloomberg Law: Corporate Transactions", THOMSON REUTERS (May 26,
2015), http://www.contractexpress.com/2015/05/some-thoughts-on-bloomberg-law-corporatetransactions/.
136. See DraftAnalyzer, supra note 133.
137. Id
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document such as a promissory note, as some recommendations are clearly
inappropriate for the particular transaction. 138
IV. THE ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATION FOR TRANSACTIONAL
PRACTICE

Automation in the drafting process offers a respite from many of the
drafting risks that have plagued transactional attorneys over the years.
Assistive programs have furthered the progress of non-automated forms in
the execution phase and have made encouraging inroads in assisting lawyers
in effectively planning transactions. But even with those diminished risks,
transactional attorneys still have an integral role to play through the planning
and execution phase, and pitfalls still lurk for those attorneys who do not
exercise appropriate diligence in each phase.
In the pursuit of efficiency and cost reduction, automated technology
has undeniably benefitted legal practice. Document assembly systems have
increased the efficiency of drafters, allowing them to reduce time allocated
to document drafting.1 39 Fewer hours spent muddling through drafting tasks
will hopefully decrease the cost of representation and provide greater
opportunities for low- and middle-income clients to obtain legal counsel.1 40
The standardized nature of the programs also promotes uniformity among
similar types of contracts, especially for those familiar with the specific
program's format.141

138. To test the system, the authors uploaded two documents: a promissory note and a
confidentiality agreement. For the note, some of the proposals included altering the defined
term "Guarantor" to "Pricing Date" and changing the legal description of the "Land" to
description of the "Business." Suggestions for the confidentiality agreement were more
relevant and generally included only linguistic variations, rather than substantive alterations.
139. Keeva, supra note 93, at SDI 1 ("It can literally do in minutes what used to take
days or even weeks."). The programs may also facilitate responsible delegation to non-lawyer
assistants such as paralegals. See id. ("Once sophisticated legal knowledge is embedded in a
system, it can be leveraged down, so that paralegals, for example, are able to construct first
drafts of complex documents that they could never have done before.").
140. See MARK A. ROBERTSON & JAMES A. CALLOWAY, WINNING ALTERNATWES TO
THE BILLABLE HOUR: STRATEGIES THAT WORK 66 (3d ed. 2008) ("[L]awyers can cut the time
it takes to develop initial drafts of documents and thus build a platform for charging clients for
the documents provided rather than for the time it takes to prepare them."). Lawyers could
lessen these cost savings, however, by billing on a per-transaction basis. See id. at 65-66;
Morrise, supra note 99, at 17 ("The key to profiting from document assembly is to charge a
fixed or flat fee that is based on the value of the service provided, not the time spent. Lawyers
who have taken this step have doubled or tripled their effective hourly billing rate.").
141. See Kenneth A. Adams et al., TransactionalSkills Training: ContractDrafting

Beyond the Basics, 10 TENN. J. BUS. L. 253, 276-78 (2009).
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Beyond the obvious efficiency-related benefits, however, the
consequences of document assembly and artificial intelligence technology
are more complex. With respect to the proficiency of transactional practice,
new technology systems can have duplicitous effects. They can assist
attorneys in providing quality representation and avoiding some of the
common missteps in typical transactional engagements. But those uses are
not unlimited, and they cannot resolve all of the common pitfalls in
transactional practice. Even with automated drafting resources, attorneys
may still risk professional mishaps.
Recall that contract drafters encounter risks of two primary types:
oversights in planning and execution errors. The former refers to whether the
drafter possesses the requisite legal knowledge to effectively represent
clients in particular transactional engagements, and involves situations
where, for example, attorneys miss an applicable legal rule or mistakenly
believe that a legal rule applies when it does not.1 42 The latter category
concerns the drafter's duty to carry out the representation in a diligent and
skillful manner, and encompasses missteps from typos to structural defects
in the document such as mistakenly omitted clauses and accidently included
information. 143
A.

Improved Execution

While advancing technology can address errors in both the planning and
execution of transactions, to date automation has been employed primarily to
reduce execution errors. Automation technology can help reduce execution
errors by eliminating inconsistent provisions, avoiding retention of language
from a prior negotiated transaction, and ensuring legal updates are
incorporated into necessary provisions.
Used with appropriate care, document assembly systems can
considerably reduce the occurrence of typographical errors in the
memorialization of the transaction. Automatic insertions based on user
responses alleviate the need for drafters or their assistants to search page
after page of dense text in search of every place for client-specific
information such as a name, date, or address.1 44 Aside from the timeconsuming and monotonous nature of the search process, attorneys can miss

142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
143. Id.
144. Nerino J. Petro, Jr., Document Automation: Using Technology to Improve Your
Practice, 32 GPSOLO 56, 57 (2015) ("Reusing a previously created document for a different
client requires [the drafter] to find each piece of information for that prior client and replace it
with the information for the new client.").
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important spaces for information, even when they use forms with designated
blank spaces. 4 5 With document assembly software, if the attorney originally
inputs the correct information, it will be accurate throughout the entire
document. 146
Equally significant is the program's ability to remove language that is
inconsistent with the user's response, namely through the use of optional and
alternative clauses. 147 Remember, for example, the case where the attorney
forgot to remove the term "per stirpes" from a trust template. 148 A properly
programmed document assembly system would have automatically excised
that language from the finished product, preserving the consistency of the
document with the client's wishes. 149
These same functions also reduce the likelihood that one provision will
wreak an unintended interpretive effect on another. Obviously, the removal
of plainly inconsistent provisions facilitates a more consistent interpretation
of the document. 15o But assembly systems can also assist drafters in
addressing more latent ambiguities, ones that attorneys can otherwise detect
only with a thorough knowledge of the document's underlying context and
the interrelation of the provisions. 51 ' These hidden flaws generally lurk most
often in highly customized precedents, in which the drafter has incorporated
the unique considerations of previous parties.1 52 In those instances, attorneys

145. Behnke v. Radtke, 222 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Wis. 1974) (the attorney neglected to fill
in a blank on the insurance amount in a form land contract).
146. Morrise, supra note 99, at 15 ("[E]ach piece of information (such as the client's
name) is only entered once. The system automatically inserts the information throughout the
document .... ). Document assembly systems cannot solve problems where attorneys
incorrectly enter the information in the first place; indeed, if that happens, the systems will
enhance the error by repeating it throughout the entire document. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Dewey Ballantine, Bushby, Palmer & Wood, 573 N.Y.S.2d 981, 984, 987 (App.
Div. 1991) (holding that the client stated a viable breach of contract claim when the attorney
failed to notice a typo in the mortgage agreement which indicated that the client's interest was
$92,885.00, rather than $92,885,000.00).
147. See Petro, supra note 144, at 58.
148. In re Lock Revocable Living Tr., 123 P.3d 1241, 1250-51 (Haw. 2005); see also
Pawtucket Inst. for Savings v. Gagnon, 475 A.2d 1028, 1031 n.1 (R.I. 1984) (noting the
attorney's failure to remove language from the standard-form mortgage deed indicating the
existence of a promissory note, when the transaction did not involve a note).
149. Morrise, supra note 99, at 16 ("[T]he system can automatically select and insert
appropriate provisions based on the legal decisions and other relevant information the lawyer
provides."); see also McIntyre v. Zac-Lac Paint & Lacquer Corp., 131 S.E.2d 640, 642 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1963) (stating that "[i]t is the lawyer's responsibility to his client to select and employ
words in the construction of [contracts] that will accurately convey" the client's intended
meaning).
150. See Morrise, supra note 99, at 15-16.
151. Petro, supra note 144, at 57.
152. See Kushner v. McLarty, 300 S.E.2d 531, 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
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may quite easily overlook the interpretive consequences of the previously
employed language.1 53 Assembly software soothes these problems because it
provides a relatively neutral starting point from which attorneys may work in
crafting the final document, without concealed traces from prior
transactions. 154
Document assembly software can also assist the drafter in customizing
the document and successfully capturing the client's expectations. 155
Decision tree logic generally prevents the most egregious failures to
customize, such as where an attorney simply uses generic forms to draft a
trust without altering the language to suit the client's needs. 156 The abilities
of properly programmed assembly software to tailor documents based on
user specifications can also aid attorneys in fulfilling specific client
expectations, such as where a client asks the attorney to exclude specific
provisions from all agreements. 157 Subject to cost restraints, the attorney
could program his or her assembly system to avoid any such language
through the use of a simple decision tree.' 5 1 In this way, the attorney could
rely less on their legal assistants who, like all humans, make mistakes, and
more on a computer he or she hardwired to eschew that provision. Now this
is not to say that document assembly systems require no supervision, or that
the attorney should wholly rely on them, as the attorney clearly must ensure
the program is functioning properly and review any agreements it
produces.1 59 They simply provide a measure of comfort to an otherwise
diligent attorney.
The ability of intemet-integrated automation systems to immediately
update also holds promise for alleviating, while not completely resolving,
the age-old problem of relying on a template with legally deficient language.
Formbooks and locally saved documents can easily grow stale with
incremental changes in the law, and even if the attorney knows the
document's date of creation, he or she must still conduct diligent research to

153. See id. (finding an issue of fact as to negligence of the attorney who used his
radiologist-client's previous employment agreement as a model to draft his new agreement,
but failed to effectuate the client's intended termination process).
154. Petro, supra note 144, at 57-68.
155. Morrise, supra note 99, at 16.
156. Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Sawers, 903 N.E.2d 309, 310 (Ohio 2009). Clearly, this benefit
depends on the attorney's actual use of the system. Indeed, an attorney who makes no effort to
appropriately customize a document may not take the time to use (or pay for) assembly
software.
157. See, e.g., McWhorter, Ltd. v. Irvin, 267 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
158. See Lischer et al., supra note 109.
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
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ascertain any potential changes.1 60 Online assembly programs, which
licensed attorneys generally administer,16' regularly incorporate any relevant
legal developments into the documents. 162 This could conceivably include
variables such as state restrictions on usurious interest rates. 163
Appropriately programmed, the system could incorporate template
restrictions that prohibit interest above the legally prescribed rate. 164
Even commercially produced documents are not infallible, however.
Although most of the cases concerning reliance on defective documents
derive from sources other than assembly programs,1 65 the drafter can never
be absolutely certain of the documents' sound nature without possessing
adequate knowledge of the legal principles and scrutinizing the
provisions.1 66 And drafters who simply rely on the assembly system
documents face serious questions of whether they have satisfied their duty of
competence. True, commercial document assembly providers have lawyers

160. See id.
161. WEALTHCOUNSEL, supra note 104.
162. See Pinegar, supra note 96. Attorneys can likely have some measure of confidence
in the quality of the programs that commercial entities provide, as those programs have
customer-driven incentives to provide a quality product.
163. Silver v. George, 618 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that it is a "per
se violation of an attorney's duty for him to draw a note which is on its face usurious").
164. Adams & Allen, supra note 98.
165. One lawyer discovered that unfortunate reality when he advised a client to use a
form that violated federal securities law. Lawyers Coop. Publ'g Co. v. Muething, 603 N.E.2d
969, 972 (Ohio 1992); see also Poferl v. Nat'l Title Co., No. C2-00-1512, 2001 WL 267464, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2001) (describing title company's preparation of promissory note
using lender-provided form which contained usurious interest rate); Burrell v. Cornelius, 570
S.W.2d 382, 383-84 (Tex. 1978) (stating that some form books contained faulty information
on how to properly prepare proposed orders). In another case, a lender hired an attorney to
conduct real estate closings and told him that the loan documents were "tried and true." In re
Goldstein, 990 A.2d 404, 406 (Del. 2010). Relying on the client's assurances, the attorney did
not review the documents. To his surprise, the documents included terms that violated federal
law, and the attorney faced disciplinary action. Id. In a similar case, the attorney agreed to
prepare a franchise agreement and disclosure statement even though he had limited experience
in that legal area. State v. Orr, 759 N.W.2d 702, 705 (Neb. 2009). He drafted the documents
using a restaurant franchise agreement and disclosure statement he had recently reviewed.
After his client experienced issues with franchisees in several states, a specializing attorney
reviewed the documents and found major deficiencies. The Nebraska Supreme Court later
found that the drafter had violated his duty of competence. Id. at 706.
166. See Complaint at 2-3, Webster v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. BC438637 (L.A.
Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2012) (asserting that the plaintiff had to hire a lawyer to remedy the
problems with a living will she purchased through LegalZoom); see also Betts & Jaep, supra
note 96, at 221 ("[T]he more restrictive the [assembly] program, the more the lawyer is forced
to rely on the program's ability to self-update, without much control over whether the
underlying questionnaires or form documents comply with changing legal rules.").
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review and approve the language in their agreements,1 67 which seemingly
falls within attorneys' ability to provide competent representation "through
the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in
question."1 68 The commentary to the Model Rules makes it clear, however,
that an attorney's obligation to supervise nonlawyer work extends to
software programs, and thus attorneys must make "reasonable efforts" to
ensure that legal services rendered through such systems are done so in "a
manner that is compatible with the lawyer's professional obligations."1 69 In
other words, drafters rely at their own peril. 170
Notably, however, no current automated software effectuates any
required formalities in executing the document outside of the drafting
process. It may remind the drafter to comply with such requirements as
having two persons witness a will or to record a mortgage, but the attorney
still bears the burden to actually perform those tasks. While these formalities
often seem trivial and obvious, failure to follow the letter of the law can
wreak havoc on the client's intended objective.i17
B. Improved Planning
In some ways, automation's potential to dramatically streamline the
execution phase of the transaction is simply a continuation of the evolution
of templates throughout the history of the legal practice. Each technological
advancement from typewriting to document assembly has brought
significant improvements in the execution process and has facilitated the
elimination of errors. 172 But, until this point, the assistive aspects of
templates have been primarily limited to the execution phase, rather than the

167. WEALTHCOUNSEL, supra note 104 ("WealthCounsel drafting solutions were
designed by estate planning attorneys .... ).
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
169. Id. r. 5.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) (stating that such obligations apply to the
"hiring of a document management company"); Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics,
Ethics Op. 05-04 (2005) (stating that law firms must exercise "reasonable efforts to ensure"
that "integrated document management application[s] . . created specifically for the legal
profession by a third-party software vendor" comply with the profession's ethical obligations);
see also In re Thrasher, 661 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ind. 1996) (finding that the attorney who relied
on a financial company to prepare a bankruptcy petition without meeting or consulting with
the client violated his duty of competency "[b]y completely relying on the factual and legal
analysis of a nonlawyer").
170. The lawyer's ability to recover costs expended in defending such actions are
dubious at best, as most document providers disclaim all responsibility for errors.
171. See, e.g., Auric v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325, 326-27 (Wis. 1983).
172. See MUNDAY, supra note 71, at 2-3, 33 (describing the benefits of word processing
in editing documents).
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planning phase. While templates have nearly always aided drafters in
anticipating and avoiding contingencies, the form's capacity for doing so has
always depended on the quality and diligence of its creator and, of course,
the drafter's willingness to spend the time required to evaluate the
document.1 73 Existing automated technologies and the developments on the
near horizon each hold the possibility of extending drafting assistance
beyond execution assistance and further into the realm of transactional
planning. As of yet, however, this promise remains largely potential.
Some of these potential benefits are within the grasp of the legal
profession simply through the proper use of existing technology.
Programmed to ask the appropriate questions for inputs into the decision
tree, document assembly systems can alert the drafter to potential areas for
further research and facilitate a more uniform and thorough fact-gathering
process.1 74 Available templates from transactional law services, both
assembly programs and otherwise, can serve as checklists and assist
attorneys in predicting potentially harmful contingencies.1 75 With neutral
templates, such as those that assembly software often uses, drafters can
identify provisions typically included in a specific type of agreement. 176
Templates that favor one side of the transaction provide valuable insight into
potential bargaining points for the drafter's client, as well as any
troublesome issues to avoid, assuming the document in fact identifies itself
as, for example, a buyer- or seller-friendly form.' 7 7
Similarly, current software holds promise for assisting the attorney in
selecting a suitable structure for the transaction. These helpful insights stem
both from the multi-faceted offerings of many assembly programs, some of
which have extensive suites of documents for various transactional
structures,178 and from the many resources available through databases

173. See Mountain, supra note 76, at 172 (explaining that the use of templates allows
lawyers to form a "good first draft").
174. See Morrise, supra note 99, at 15-16.
175. Id. ("A document assembly system acts like an automated checklist, prompting the
lawyer to think of relevant issues or document provisions that otherwise might be missed in
the first draft.").
176. See Keeva, supra note 93, at SDI1 (explaining the need to use a "sufficiently broadbased form").
177. See, e.g., Stock Purchase Agreement (Pro-BuyerLong Form), THOMSON REUTERS:
PRACTICAL LAW, https://ca.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-382-9882?originationContex
t=document&transitionType=Documentltem&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true&bhcp
=1 (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
178. See WEALTHCOUNSEL, supra note 104.
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maintained by companies like Practical Law 79 and Bloomberg Law. 180 By
simply looking through the catalogues of the various transaction types, the
attorney can obtain a rough idea of a range of possible structures. Of greater
assistance, many templates contain extensive drafting notes that describe
various considerations involved in the transaction, which can affect the
attorney's decision on whether to utilize the particular structure.
Like past templates, however, the actual realization of these benefits
remains tied to the attorney's level of diligence in using the technology. If,
for example, the attorney never relays the document assembly program's
questions to the client, it can accomplish little in streamlining the factgathering process."' Vast libraries of drafting commentary cannot improve
an attorney's prediction of contingencies or skillfulness in structuring the
transaction if he or she does not read them. And even if the drafter peruses
the notes, he or she must actually consider them in the context of the client's
unique circumstances in order to provide effective counsel.' 82 The machines
of the present day cannot yet perform that required scrutiny and
application, 8 3 and even highly advanced software such as Bloomberg's
Draft Analyzer requires the drafter to use care in selecting the language he or
she utilizes. 184

Recent developments in automation have indicated a possibility for
artificial intelligence to eventually bridge this gap in planning transactions.
Machine learning technology, with its ability to process massive amounts of
data and draw newer, better conclusions based on those precedents, offers
encouraging (and, perhaps, for many transactional attorneys, frightful) signs
for an increasingly fruitful association between transactional practice and

179. See Model Contracts, Legal Agreements, and Clauses, THOMSON REUTERS:
LAW, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/solutions/practicallaw/legal-contracts-agreements-clauses (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
180. See Bloomberg Law: Corporate Transactions, BNA, https://www.bna.com/
uploadedFiles/BNAV2/Legal/Products/Subscriptions/Corporate,_Transactional,_andAntitru
st/BloombergLaw CorporateTransactionsBrochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
181. Some firms allow clients to provide information directly through the use of a
"secure extranet client space." RICHARD S. GRANAT, DIRECTLAw, ONLINE LEGAL SERVICES:
THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7 (2010), https://www.directlaw.com/futureof
legalprofessiowoappend.pdf ("Enabling the client to provide the data directly into an on-line
interview reduces the time that the attorney has to spend on the interview process and results in
an instantaneous generation of a draft ready for a lawyer's more detailed review. Web-enabled
document assembly enlists the client's effort in providing the data that is used to create a
customized document without initial lawyer intervention.").
182. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
183. See Betts & Jaep, supra note 96, at 221 ("[E]ven the best programmers cannot
foresee all possible scenarios at the time they craft the original algorithms.").
184. See DraftAnalyzer, supra note 133, at 1.
PRACTICAL
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automation.' 8 5 Yet it is overwhelmingly difficult, if not impossible, to
predict whether that momentous transition into automated planning may
come to pass in the near or distant future. 8 6 Perhaps in only a few years
machine learning software for transactions will be able to fully assess and
advise attorneys on relative merits of an individual client's disclaiming an
inheritance, or the advantages of an asset purchase versus a stock
acquisition.'8 7 But such software is not currently available to the vast
majority of lawyers who perform transactional work throughout the country,
even if rudimentary prototypes exist in the research and development
departments of Silicon Valley.' For now, the diligence of the operator
continues to limit the reach of technological innovation.
C. Praisethe Machine-With Caution
To the modem-day drafter, increasingly sophisticated automated
technology offers a host of resources stretching from the commencement of
the engagement to closing. Transactional attorneys can access a seemingly
endless trove of electronic forms by simply searching keywords, 8 9 and they
may employ advanced document assembly programs to generate

185. See Daniel Ben-Ari et al., "Danger, Will Robinson"? Artificial Intelligence in the
Practice of Law: An Analysis and Proofof Concept Experiment, 23 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 69
(2017) (citing McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 124, at 3050) ("Machine intelligence will
evolve to generate documents that answer the specific needs of an individual. When these files
are reviewed in court, Al will be able to improve the documents by tracking their
effectiveness, using his learning abilities."); McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 124, at 3041
("[W]hen machine intelligence becomes as good as lawyers in developing some service . . it
does not stop improving. . . . Such continuous technological acceleration in computational
power is the difference between previous technological improvements in legal services and
those driven by machine intelligence.").
186. See McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 124, at 3045 ("[B]efore the combination of
hardware, software, and connectivity progresses to a certain point, machine intelligence
represents no substitute for human activity.").
187. See id. at 3051 ("In the future, machine processing will be able to automate a form,
tailor it according to the specific facts and legal arguments, and track its effect in future
litigation."); Daniel Ben-Ari et al., supra note 185, at 60 ("Lawyers may also become a dying
breed, as algorithms learn how to structure claims, check contracts for problematic caveats,
negotiate deals, predict legal strategies, and more."); David Barnhizer, Artificial Intelligence
and Its Implications for Lawyers and Law Schools 9 (2017) (unpublished paper),
https://works.bepress.com/davidbarnhizer/ (predicting a shift in the nature, and perhaps the
amount, of legal jobs in the coming decades).
188. See Matthew Field, Facebook Shuts Down Robots After They Invent Their Own
Language, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:21 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/20
17/08/01/facebook-shuts-robots-invent-language/.
189. See THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters
.com/law-products/solutions/practical-law/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
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professional-looking work product (assuming they are willing to pay the
provider an appropriate fee).' 9 0 These tools offer a number of advantages,
both in expediting the drafting process and in facilitating its completion in
an effective manner. But while these technological developments deserve a
warm welcome, the legal profession should tread cautiously in traversing the
ethical implications of such automated programs. As the automated nature of
legal practice accelerates, so too does the risk of undue deference to
computer-generated outputs.
In some respects, the need for a healthy dose of hesitation in
wholeheartedly embracing automated programs parallels concerns drafters
faced when the intemet emerged as a resource. By dramatically expanding
drafters' access to templates of varying origins, the worldwide web
exacerbated the need for attorneys to carefully scrutinize every form they
use. 191 The immense range of possible sources often diminished users'
ability to obtain adequate contextual knowledge of the form's creation. This,
in turn, restricted drafters' means of verifying the quality of a given template
and, more generally, its suitability for each specific client. 192
These limitations mean not that attorneys should avoid utilizing the
latest resources, but only that they should exercise heightened care in
selecting and using each form.1 93 Templates which contain drafting
commentary and originate from a known credible source generally offer the
most reliable pathways for discerning context and conducting other
appropriate diligence.1 94 Precedents from obscure sources, sans details of the
underlying transaction, present drafters with a more daunting task in
ascertaining the suitability of a template. 195 Yet, the drafter must utilize

190. See Morrise, supra note 99, at 15.
191. Washington & Stefanoudakis, supra note 88, at 67 ("The user must always canvass
the legal subject area for which he or she is drafting a document to see if any recent changes in
the law have occurred.").
192. STARK, supra note 25, at 412 ("[Attorneys] can obtain forms from industry
associations, treatises, continuing legal education materials, and online. Be wary of all these
precedents; quality varies.").
193. Even in the pre-internet era, attorneys who used templates faced the risk that the
form would be defective, whether it was out of date or otherwise. See, e.g., Lawyers Coop.
Publ'g Co. v. Muething, 603 N.E.2d 969, 970 (Ohio 1992) (where a state indicted an attorney
who used a formbook to prepare promissory notes that violated state securities laws).
194. STARK, supra note 25, at 412 (stating that precedents from familiar sources provide
"ready access to the precedent's drafter, who can explain the purpose behind provisions that
[the attorney] do[es] not understand").
195. Foster, supra note 81, at 962 ("Even assuming that the document an attorney finds
was appropriate for the specific transaction it was negotiated for, it may not be appropriate for
present drafting needs. Even more so, that precedent document itself may have been the
product of heavy reliance on previously drafted agreements.").
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available resources in understanding the transaction and any alternatives in
customizing and scrutinizing the documents. Drafting a document in blind
reliance on an unfamiliar form puts the attorney at risk for failing to meet the
minimum standards for adequate representation.1 96
The increasing ease with which automated programs can generate
apparently comprehensive transactional documents has only magnified these
concerns. In the past, there were fewer opportunities and incentives to
blindly rely on a form document without tailoring it to the specific client,
primarily because of the patently defective results of such reliance. 197 Now,
advanced software can assemble a customized document in a matter of
minutes, tailor-made to effectuate the user's responses to the program's
inquiries. 198 Instead of a plainly generic document, the program produces a
streamlined, superficially impressive work product.1 99
Assembly software's capability to produce seemingly flawless
customized legal instruments in a matter of minutes can lull users into a
deceptive confidence in the machine's outputs. Coupled with the steep cost
of many commercial document assembly services, the programs can tempt
attorneys to take on unfamiliar matters they would not otherwise accept. In
that sense, financial concerns joined with the expansive wherewithal of
automated technology can create a false safety net for users, potentially
leading them to unduly strain their sphere of proficiency in complex areas of
law.
Those drafters who step beyond their comfort levels can find themselves
in tenuous situations even with automated assistance. If the attorney fails to
properly account for the limitations of current software in terms of planning
and executing the transaction, those shortcomings may trigger unfortunate
results for the client. On a more fundamental level, attorneys who range
beyond their expertise (and beyond their willingness or capacity to
thoroughly review the unfamiliar transaction on the client's timeline) may be
unable to satisfy their basic duties of requisite knowledge and skill and of

196. See Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 239, 244 (La. 1972)
("[L]awyers are obligated to scrutinize any contract which they advise their clients to execute,
and are required to disclose the full import of the instrument and the possible consequences
that may arise upon execution of it."); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (AM.
BAR Ass'N 2016).
197. See, e.g., Toledo Bar Ass'n v. Sawers, 903 N.E.2d 309, 310-11 (Ohio 2009)
(disciplining an attorney who drafted a trust using a generic form without tailoring the
language to the client's needs).
198. See Mountain, supra note 76, at 172.
199. See Morrise, supra note 99, at 15-16.
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consultation and explanation.200 Like the inexperienced attorney who agreed
to draft a Clifford trust, 20 ' drafters who accept representations in new legal
areas may breach their duty of competence if they simply rely on automated
technology to achieve the client's objectives, rather than undertaking
research necessary to become knowledgeable on the relevant legal issues.202
And if the attorney does not fully understand the matter, obviously he or she
will generally lack the ability to explain it to the extent reasonably necessary
to allow the client to make an informed decision. 203
This is not to say that attorneys should decline to venture into novel
legal areas if they are willing (and have the time) to conduct necessary
research and attain sufficient familiarity with the matter. Indeed, the Model
Rules expressly contemplate such representations.204 But in considering an
expansion into unfamiliar grounds, attorneys must ensure they actually
perform that diligent study, rather than abdicating that responsibility to any
resource, including automated technology. 205
V.

CONCLUSION

The drafting toolkit of the modem transactional lawyer abounds with
valuable resources. From print-based relics of times past to emerging
automated technologies, drafters may draw on a litany of assistive devices in
crafting agreements to accomplish their clients' goals. Properly utilized,
increasingly advanced software has the potential to drastically reduce

200. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) ("To
maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law
and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology, engage in
continuing study and education and comply with all continuing legal education requirements to
which the lawyer is subject.").
201. Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720-21 (Ct. App. 1979).
202. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
203. Matter of Thrasher, 661 N.E.2d 546, 549 (Ind. 1996) ("It is essential to the integrity
of any legal practice that lawyers maintain independent professional judgment and not fully
abdicate the responsibility of providing legal advice, guidance and expertise to nonlawyers.");
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016).
204. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2016) ("A
lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study.")
205. In this way, attorneys' duties approximate those of a corporate board of directors,
whose members may rely in good faith on information that reasonably selected outside experts
provide, but cannot merely abdicate their responsibilities to govern the organization. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (West 2018); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2009); Ash v. McCall, No.
Civ.A.17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *9 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000) (stating that delegation to
"qualified experts" of "due diligence review of a target company's books and records . . .is not
an 'abdication' of duty").
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execution errors ranging from typos to linguistic inconsistences and to
substantially increase the consistency and uniformity of documents.
Equally encouraging is the potential for automation to resolve many
planning errors, which traditional precedential tools have historically not
reached. When appropriately used, current resources such as document
assembly systems and annotated forms can greatly benefit transactional
planners. Artificial intelligence holds the promise of propelling this planning
assistance to new levels through cutting-edge machine learning software.
But this promise remains largely inchoate, as present-day artificial
intelligence systems are still in the early stages of development and face
significant restraints on their utility.206

The nascent status of automation and artificial intelligence places the
legal profession in a unique position. Despite existing programs' potential to
alleviate many conventional burdens tied to transactional practice, effective
representation still depends ultimately on the degree of skill and diligence
the attorney exercises. But automated systems may sometimes obscure this
reality with their ability to easily generate streamlined, customized legal
documents. Some attorneys, especially those who have invested heavily in
sophisticated systems, may feel pressure to expand their practice and
services into complex and wide-ranging matters. While automation and Al,
like many previous technological innovations, can facilitate responsible
expansion, they can also obscure the risks involved in venturing into
uncharted professional waters.

206. A notable hindrance is the inability to procure adequate precedential material for the
machine learning systems outside of public databases such as EDGAR. See Betts & Jaep,
supra note 96, at 230. For optimal function, the systems need access to a range of documents
for a particular transaction type. See id. As many law firms are notoriously guarded with their
transactional documents, this type of stockpile remains elusive. See id.
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